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James Hurford’s Language in the Light of Evolution two-volume project aims to 
bring together an up-to-date account of the synthesis of language in the light of 
evolution, going from meaningful mental representations, widespread in the 
animal kingdom, to the emergence of the first words and their grammatical 
combination. The then upcoming successor of volume I alongside with its 
contents is already sketched out in the preface of the first volume. The two parts 
are organized to cover different aspects of human language and its precursors, 
although the length of the second volume makes some degree of overlap 
unavoidable. Volume I deals with the content of meaning (i.e. semantics) and its 
interpersonal use (i.e. pragmatics), while volume II focuses on core notions of 
grammar and discusses the ins and outs of the evolution of language in a three-
step travel: a first shared lexicon, a two-word stage, and grammaticalization pro-
cedures. Albeit their different objects of study, the two volumes complement 
each other and are unified under an evolutionary approach. It is worth mention-
ing for the sake of completeness that the duology could be a trilogy as Hurford 
notes in the preface of the volume II. Having covered the origins of meaning in 
volume I and the origins of grammar in volume II, the origins of speech (i.e. 
phonetics and phonology) should be addressed next. However, as Hurford notes, 
such accounts exist in the literature; among the most recent ones is Fitch (2010).  
 Starting off with The Origins of Meaning, the standard gradualist (neo-) 
Darwinian perspective through which Hurford approaches the topic of language 
origins is made explicit from the beginning. This contrasts with the relative lack 
of clarity when it comes to the linguistic framework against which the discussion 
unfolds — contrary to what happens in volume II, where Minimalism together 
with other frameworks (e.g., Construction Grammar, Formal Language Theory) 
is often put under (at times, comparative) scrutiny. Hurford frequently refers to 
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Tomasello’s and Call’s work in volume I; a fact that led to the claim that his 
linguistic stance is probably cognitivist (Edwardes 2009: 191). The Minimalist 
Program is not brought into the discussion up until chapter 8, and when this 
happens, the passage from pre-Minimalism days (before Chomsky 1995) to what 
Hurford refers to as the “current Chomskyan position […] that the only possibly 
distinctive property of the human language faculty in the narrow sense (i.e. not 
shared with either animal communication or with human non-linguistic cog-
nition) is recursion” (p. 285) is mentioned only in passing.1 
 In the first part of volume I, Hurford presents the elements that comprise 
animal thought of the world when thought and perception was yet untrimmed 
by the need to communicate as humans do. Special emphasis is laid on defining 
concepts, also in terms of an evolutionary continuum: Proto-concepts were 
succeeded by pre-linguistic concepts which were followed by linguistic concepts 
(p. 12). Hurford’s understanding of the term ‘concept’ is partly in line with 
Fodor’s (1998) treatment of concepts as indicating subparts of states of mind. It is 
argued that Fodor sets five conditions for having concepts and Hurford embraces 
viewing concepts as (i) mental particulars, (ii) categories, (iii) compositional, and 
(iv) often learned. He claims that he parts company with Fodor only on the fifth 
requirement: (v) that concepts are public; “they’re the sorts of things that lots of 
people can, and do, share” (Fodor 1998: 28). This deviance on the fifth condition is 
the result of Hurford talking about animal, pre-linguistic concepts that exist 
before communicative and social needs arise, whereas Fodor describes human, 
post-linguistic concepts. However there is some (yet not well known) degree of 
difference between what is ascribed to Fodor and what Fodor has really claimed. 
Therefore, Fodor and Hurford part company in point (iv) already, since Fodor 
does not assume concepts to be learned.  
 The first volume is a very welcome contribution in that it brings together 
various experimental findings that pertain to the evolution of animal (i.e. pre-
linguistic) cognition. It surveys many aspects of non-human cognitive functions 
in a range of primates, but also other (marine) mammals and birds. It also 
touches upon a recently-evolved domain of cognition that has been argued to be 
unique to humans (Tulving 1999): episodic memory. Hurford rightly juxtaposes 
the argument for episodic memory being a uniquely human trait to experimental 
findings coming from a variety of (food-storing) species such as squirrels, Ameri-
can scrub jays, honeybees, and great apes. The conclusion he draws is that there 
is evidence from experiments with animal food-storing and neurophysiological 
studies of rat dreaming, for assuming a kind of episodic memory in non-humans 
that is less domain-general than the one humans have, but still one that could be 
viewed as a seed from which the human capacity evolved (p. 83).2  
                                                
    1 Notice here that this is not the then current Chomskyan position (it is, in fact, Hauser et al.’s 
2002) to the extent that Fitch et al. (2005), to whom Hurford makes no reference in the first 
volume, are more perspicuous than Hauser et al. on the possibility that the contents of the 
faculty of language in the narrow sense (FLN) are subject to empirical determination and 
FLN might turn out to be empty, resulting in a claim that only “language as a whole is 
unique to our species” (Fitch et al. 2005: 181).  
    2 However, human episodic memory, although better than the one observed in other species, 
can be proven fairly poor. Hurford cites the case of eyewitness testimony (Wells & Olson 
2003); more recent experiments suggest that poor performance might be attributed to episo-
dic memory undergoing a reconsolidation process after recalling an event (Chan et al. 2009). 
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 Discussing proto-propositions, Hurford argues against a drastic jump in 
the course of evolution and contrasts his view that animals are capable of having 
a proposition-like cognition with Dummett’s (1993) view that animals show 
proto-thought but are not in a position to entertain propositions. Discussing 
numerical limits on the size of propositions (an issue re-introduced in volume II), 
Chomsky’s distinction between competence and performance is introduced and 
an argument is made for memory limitations on the size of simple propositions 
being consistent with the generative stance that a predicate could potentially take 
an unlimited number of arguments. In this context, the limit of maximum four 
arguments per predicate is viewed as a matter of performance, since “U[niversal] 
G[rammar] imposes no constraint on the number of arguments a predicate may 
take” (p. 90). However first, performance-imposed restrictions are not necessarily 
UG-derived constraints and second, the ‘maximum four arguments per predi-
cate’ constraint is not absolute. Consider (1), for example:  
  
(1) X hit y with z at place p and time t.  
 
 In the second part of the first book, the focus is on communication which 
translates into interactions between animals of the same species, since when 
animals communicate with animals belonging to different species (e.g., the 
example of a shepherd whistling commands to a sheepdog that Hurford lists), 
this communication is not reciprocal in the sense that even if there is a response, 
this will be in a different code. Communicative acts in the systems of various 
primates are brought together in Hurford’s review of a broad amount of 
literature in animal communication research which does justice to most current 
findings that primatology and biology report. Of course, evolution of such 
devices only makes sense if animals are biologically disposed to share 
information with their peers by communicating it to each other. The origins of 
this need to communicate are sketched out in relation to the phenomenon of 
niche-construction in biology — a correlation more developed in the last part of 
the second volume — which is argued to have facilitated rapid changes that in 
turn gave rise to new domains of social interaction and co-operation. The answer 
Hurford gives to the crucial question of why such a principle came to exist boils 
down to the aspect of the Darwinian theory that emphasizes the importance of 
selected traits being of some benefit to the individuals that make use of them. 
Hurford concludes the second part of this first volume by admitting that no 
single theory (such as Kin Selection or Sexual Selection) can on its own “ade-
quately explain the unique human characteristic of freely giving information in 
such structurally complex ways as we do every day with language” (p. 333). 
 Maintaining the perspective on the “no fundamental difference” (Darwin 
1871: 35) between non-humans’ and humans’ mental life, Hurford deals in The 
Origins of Grammar with the core components of language and the consequences 
of its breakthrough in communicating thoughts, putting in parallel alike 
communicative traits between both genera. Within the domain of what he calls 
pre-grammar, where he meticulously describes the disposition of rhythmic 
patterns in animal songs, he does not go past some cognitive factors, such as 
memory limitations constraining communication. He presents several striking 




constants in the messages of other species, which resemble constraints one 
observes in human language: parallel chaffinch song has a median of seven 
apparent ‘phrases’; bird songs are roughly the same length as typical spoken 
human sentences, between one and ten seconds. If humans also possess a limit on 
the selected arguments a predicate can take (‘the magical number 4’) — a fact to 
which he gave, probably for the first time in (bio)linguistic research, a psycho-
logical explanation (i.e. ‘subitization’, similar in monkeys and humans) — these 
computational limitations, Hurford argues, should not be bypassed in the acqui-
sition and development of language; that is, they should not be regarded as a 
matter of performance, according to generative thinking, but comprised — from 
the very beginning — into what Chomsky (1965 et seq.) called ‘competence’. De-
parting, thus, from the mainstream generative view, Hurford introduces the term 
‘competence-plus’ with which he spans grammatical specifications (what 
competence stands for) and numerical constraints (the plus) into one: “[N]o orga-
nism learns or acquires competence immune from the quantitative constraints of 
its body” (p. 56); “the interaction happens not after competence has been formed, 
but while competence is being formed” (p. 247).3 According to his view, the 
mechanisms constraining language processing are central to the human language 
faculty (UG+), and, accordingly, the human language faculty should not keep 
being considered “unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as me-
mory limitations” (Chomsky 1965: 3) anymore. A different question is whether 
this re-orientation (the plus) on such linguistic presupposition (competence) will be 
included at some point in future linguistic research — and how so. 
 When it comes to the comparative issue of cognitive differences, the con-
viction with which in The Origins of Meaning non-human animals were endowed 
with concepts seems now diminished in The Origins of Grammar by an important 
factor: the enhancement of Thought. Hurford acknowledges that “those who 
deny that animals can have full concepts do have a point […]. There is a differ-
ence between pre-linguistic concepts, or proto-concepts, such as I have freely pos-
tulated in the earlier book, and fully-fledged human concepts” (p. 154, emphasis 
ours). The genuine ‘feedback loop’ which enriches in tandem language and 
thought proves to be a crucial reason for the terminological distinction. Hurford 
alludes to Sapir’s (1921) and Bickerton’s (2009) claims on the reciprocity between 
the ‘instrument’ and the ‘product’ or the ‘species’ and the ‘niche’ respectively in 
order to show that this view of the Language–Thought relationship can receive 
support by observing the parallels it has in other domains. 
 But what did exactly enable this very reciprocal relation? Hurford depicts 
some coherent scenarios on the matter. The public labeling of mental repre-
sentations — our ‘first shared lexicon’ — was probably started up, according to 
his exercise of retrospection, by a three-step process: First, a hominin should have 
produced a random noise attempting to convey some idea; second, some hearer 
guessed from the context what idea was meant; and third, the random noise 
became arbitrarily associated with that idea. Subsequently, by a combination of 
                                                
    3 Physical patterns/laws even precede living beings’ nature, as it is put forward in Burge’s 
theory of perceptual representation (2010: 521): “the rhythms of the environment are en-
coded in an organism’s physical rhythms. Objective intunement precedes objective repre-
sentation”. 
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social ingredients, such as trust and cooperation, humans became to realize 
meaningful signals were advantageous, and a voluntary control over their use 
increased too. It is in this way that Hurford conceives Deacon’s (2010) concept of 
symbolic niche as a point of no return towards our current complex languages. 
Nevertheless, there still is ‘something’ missing at a deeper level, which must have 
favored this new habitat: If we assume that only humans make use of a symbolic 
(triadic) communication and a developed thought, there must be an important 
mental transition between core cognitive levels,4 a transition that did not occur in 
other animals which are also inhabitants of niches.5 
 Of course, this terminological issue has something to do with Hurford’s 
adscription to the gradual continuity in syntactic evolution particularly, and in 
general animal cognition. He defends the continuum path from the ‘one-word 
stage’ to our current state of complex syntax, in the same way as he promoted in 
volume I the graduality of meaning in our wide animal kingdom. While plead-
ing the case for an ‘evolutionary journey’, left-hemisphere specialization for audi-
tory attention to conspecific calls links monkeys and humans in a thread of con-
tinuous evolution; by contrast, the same cannot be said regarding continuity from 
primate calls to words, where facts go against a straightforward continuity: 
“[T]here is no inconsistency in arguing for (1) continuity in production of simple 
calls and auditory attention to the calls of conspecifics, and (2) discontinuity in 
vocal learning and  in production of complex signals” (p. 111). However, the un-
derlying mechanisms which triggered both processes were essential for human 
spoken languages to develop; what is more, appealing to the lowest common de-
nominator — i.e. ‘voicing’ — would include not only primates, but all mammals 
(Tallerman 2011: 486). 
 Once the symbolic niche was settled, speech began to evolve. Going 
through several sections about common properties of languages, anthropology, 
particularities in syntax, and genotype changes, Hurford reaches a primitive ling-
uistic stage where units had “an internal coherence distinguishing them from any 
kind of looser discourse-level organization. At its simplest, this coherence is 
marked by pauses at the boundaries of the units” (p. 608). In Bickerton’s view of 
protolanguage, many two-word utterances at that stage should have contained 
words denoting actions and objects, although non-­‐syntactically determined. Hur-
ford explains this phenomenon in pragmatic terms, namely, the bipartite organi-
zation responds to a distinction between ‘constant’ (what you are talking about: 
topic) and ‘changing’ (new information: comment); moreover, if a single word is 
not enough to identify the topic, another object-denoting word may be placed 
together (and will eventually become an adjective, if grammaticalized).  
                                                
4 This alludes to cognitive levels such as perception, conceptual spaces, propositional 
thought, (core) knowledge, etc., which imply computation and mental representations. If 
there was a significant change, one might legitimately wonder from where to where exactly 
this transition took place. Moreover, if non-human animals possess all the mentioned repre-
sentational ‘stages’ in a primitive (/proto-)way, what is the nature of the spark that made 
humans, but no other animals, evolve in particular way, given that non-human animals 
form their own niches as well? 
5 By way of illustration: “If we do not rule by fiat that the term concept be reserved only for 
linguistic creatures such as adult humans, the categories in terms of which an animal segre-
gates its experiences can reasonably be called proto-concepts at least” (Hurford 2011: 371). 




 In an insightful link in volume I, Hurford puts forward the connection bet-
ween the ventral and dorsal neural pathways, and predicate–argument structure 
respectively (a connection already suggested by Jackendoff & Landau 1992: 121–
123). In a nutshell, the dorsal pathway (‘where-stream’) is said to identify the 
location of an object; the ventral pathway (‘what-stream’) gives all the properties 
necessary to identify it. External objects delivered by the dorsal stream are given 
individual variables (x, y, z); categorical judgments about objects’ properties are 
delivered by the ventral stream and considered predicates (red, cat, Mary). 
Additionally, two types of psychological attention take part in this process: 
global attention delivers one-place judgments about the whole scene, while local 
attention delivers one-place judgments about the objects within each scene; the 
two processes, global and local, operate in parallel. The notation Hurford pro-
poses follows that of the Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp & Reyle 1993) 
regarding the use of boxes; he depicts each one containing the conflated 
information of both the dorsal and the ventral stream through the two attentional 
processes; e.g., FLY-SMALL (local attention), or FLY FLY-SMALL   (global and local). 
However, the public arrangement of this bipartite information is not developed 
any further in neuroanatomical terms but in linguistic ones and the neural 
streams make way for pragmatic distinctions. Despite this, recent parallel 
research indirectly underpin this interdisciplinary enterprise of Hurford’s, whose 
importance lies in the appealing connection between neuroanatomy, cognition, 
and language. The set of linkages that the Complex Systems Theory proposes 
allows envisaging a primitive mechanism of this word-word coherent associ-
ation; as Solé (2005: 289) argues, “two words will be linked if they share at least 
one object of reference”. Similarly, in the field of semantics, Pietroski (to appear) 
advocates that phrasal meanings are instructions for how to build concepts; in his 
view, for instance, the lexical expression brown cow assembles the concepts 
BROWN and COW to form the monadic concept BROWN-COW (i.e. no brown cows 
can be thought as not being cows). Solé’s and Pietroski’s associations seem to 
resemble Hurford’s neural linkage, and their two-word/concept conjunction 
susceptible of being originally identified by the dorsal pathway (which would be 
tracking one object, assigned a variable x), and categorized twice by the ventral 
pathway — according to his view. In this sense, the external shape may be some-
how mirroring the internal one, or following similar (neurological) principles; a 
subtle issue, that Hurford has preferred not to go into in volume II. 
 In an overall assessment and comparison of both volumes, the first one 
deals with issues on the evolution of communication in a somewhat clearer 
manner than the second one deals with aspects of grammar again in the light of 
evolution. This could be partly due to the size of the second volume — which at 
times makes it hard to retain the kind of thematic continuity that one enjoys 
throughout the first volume — and partly due to the fact that the first volume is 
more succinct in placing the discussion of whatever notions unwoven in the 
appropriate (i.e. as informative as possible) perspective through forming fruitful 
connections with a broad amount of literature from primatology, neuroscience, 
philosophy, and linguistics.  
 The second volume is slightly lacking in this respect; consider, for instance, 
the argument about non-compositionality in complex signs in animal communi-
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cation: Hurford correctly points out that the syntax of these sequences is not 
semantically compositional, however this claim should ideally be connected to 
pre-existing related claims (e.g., Mirolli & Nolfi 2010, Byrd & Mintz 2010) that one 
finds in the literature on this topic. Another reason that the first volume is more 
coherent and overall making a more significant contribution is that the content of 
this volume (i.e. the evolution of semantics and pragmatics) offers fertile ground 
for identifying parallels of (sub-aspects of) key functions of human cognition in 
the cognitive systems of other species, therefore it nicely supports an argument 
against a drastic, single-step advancement in the course of evolution. On the 
contrary, the subject matter of the second volume is the evolution of grammar. 
Once the point of inquiry shifts from semantics and pragmatics to syntax, the 
task of finding the relevant parallels in other species that would allude to the 
gradual character of evolution becomes more burdensome because it is precisely 
in this level of linguistic analysis that humans differ greatly from other species 
(take, for instance, the ability to — compositionally and hierarchically — combine 
lexicalized concepts into larger sequences). 
 The aforementioned concerns notwithstanding, Hurford’s duology pro-
vides in its totality one of the broadest syntheses of a variety of topics in the area 
of the evolution of communication and grammar in humans. As such, this work 
is of great interest especially to those who wish to acquire a background in 
biolinguistics that is truly interdisciplinarily informed by recent developments in 
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